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“The concept of duality is crucial in both mathematics and physics.”
‘Folklore’, as quoted in Zeidler (2009, p. 693).
‘Duality’ is perhaps an overused word in physics and mathematics: there’s
arithmetic duality, projective duality, Alexander duality, Pontryagin dual-
ity, wave-particle duality, electro-magnetic duality, Kramers-Wannier dual-
ity, Morita duality, Grothendiek duality, DHS duality, S-duality, T-duality,
to name just a handful. It has more than a whiff of the mystical about it,
which is rather unfortunate. However, the overhanging mystical elements, es-
pecially originating in the concept of ‘Yinyang’ from Chinese philosophy, are
not so off the mark. Like Yinyang, dualities in mathematics and physics are
marked by a curious mixture of opposition and sameness or equivalence (see
fig.1).
For example, Yin is associated with dark, feminine, passivity, and so on, while
Yang is associated with light, masculine, and activity. In Chinese cosmology,
the various phenomena of the universe are then viewed as an interplay of
these duelling concepts. Further, the two sides are inextricably entangled and
interdependent, neither making complete sense without the other: there is no
sense of one side of the dual pair being more fundamental or superior. So seems
to be the case with dualities in science, with a similar entanglement holding
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Fig. 1. Taiji diagram (often known as the yinyang diagram). The small
white-in-black and black-in-white circles represent the interdependence of oppo-
sites—the idea that there is, in some sense, a little of the opposite encoded or
embodied in the other. [Image source: Lai Zhide, Yijing Laizhu tujie (Chengdu: Ba
Shu shushe, 1688/1989: p. 553).
together duelling concepts such as ‘hot/cold,’ ‘big/small,’ ‘high energy/low
energy,’ ‘finite/infinite,’ ‘composite/elementary,’ ‘localized/delocalized,’ etc.,
though in such a way that an equivalence holds between them at some level—
in general, one finds that some quantity and its reciprocal are involved in a
duality mapping. There is, then, mystery in dualities, in making sense of how
there can be equivalence given such apparently stark differences (differences
labeled, in this special issue, as “striking” by De Haro et al. and “shocking”
by Huggett). Yet, within this mystery there lies a golden opportunity for
philosophers.
Despite their ubiquity and importance in physics, mathematics, and logic, it
is fair to say philosophers have yet to embrace dualities with the gusto they
deserve. 2 This is particularly unfortunate since dualities connect to a great
many issues that philosophers have fully embraced. To name a few notable
examples:
• Reduction, emergence, and fundamentality
• Theoretical equivalence and synonymy
• Underdetermination and empirical equivalence
2 There are, as always, some exceptions: Dawid (2007), Castellani (2009), Rickles
(2011), Matsubara (2013), Muntean (2015), Read (2016).
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• Realism versus anti-realism
• Unification in (and of) mathematics and physics
This special issue, based in part on a conference held in Florence in Septem-
ber 2014, will attempt to bring these connections to wider attention, hopefully
functioning as a first point of contact for philosophers previously unacquainted
with dualities: dualities promise to enliven, or at least weigh upon, these old
philosophers’ favourites. What is especially interesting about these above top-
ics, from the point of view of dualities, is the novel ways in which they can
be seen to interact. Most of the papers in this volume straddle all of them at
once, despite taking some one individual topic as their core focus.
As we understand the concept of duality in this special issue, dualities be-
long to the general class of symmetries (read ‘differences [of one sort] without
differences [of another sort]’), though in this case linking theories, or very dif-
ferent regimes of the same theory (in the case of self-duality), rather than
solutions to theories as one finds with standard symmetries and gauge sym-
metries. That is, we should envisage dualities as acting on a space of theories
– more precisely, a ‘moduli space’ – rather than on the space of solutions of a
single theory as with standard symmetries. 3
Because we are transforming one theoretical description to another, the changes
are much more radical than with symmetry transformations that map be-
tween solutions of the same theory (which will naturally involve entities with
the same physical interpretation). Theories, on the other hand, can contain
very different natural interpretations in terms of objects (e.g. particles, fields,
strings, branes, etc.), properties, degrees of freedom, and spacetime back-
grounds that seem to be utterly dissimilar. However, it isn’t immediately ob-
vious whether duality transformations point to a representational redundancy
or something new. Of course, we can’t really answer this question properly
until we have some firm principle of individuation for theories, so that we can
decide when we have two distinct theories rather than one theory multiply
realised or represented. 4 These and related questions are tackled in several of
the essays in this special issue. From this brief description alone, it is clear that
the study of dualities combines several central topics of philosophy of physics
3 However, despite this understanding, we have included relevant contributions
dealing with a slightly wider notion of duality (such as wave-particle duality and
logico-mathematical dualities). These can be brought close enough to our more spe-
cific understanding (that of a reciprocal relationship linking seemingly physically
incompatible concepts), and because they share many of the same features they
have the potential to yield new insights.
4 See Fuchs and Schweigert (1997, p. 14) for more on this point. We might decide
ultimately that this is really a distinction without a difference. It is possible that
dualities ought to be integral to the debate over how we should individuate theories
(something that Rickles discusses in his contribution).
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(and more general philosophy of science) in a novel and interesting way. This
special issue will give to readers new to the subject a broad overview of several
possible research directions.
The initial essay by Joseph Polchinski, one of the leaders in the development
of dualities in string theory, offers a conceptually-oriented guide to the various
types of duality in physics: dualities between quantum field theories, between
string theories (T-duality and S-duality), and between descriptions which are,
respectively, a quantum field theory and a string theory (gauge/gravity dual-
ities). By illustrating the role played by these dualities “in mapping out the
structure of theoretical physics” and discussing, at the same time, their con-
ceptual meaning, Polchinski provides an essential overview for an informed
and critical reading of the following twelve, more specific contributions to this
special issue.
A substantial portion of the philosophical interest in these essays centers on
the question of what is meant by ‘physical equivalence’ (and difference). To
obtain from the study of dualities a more nuanced understanding of equiv-
alences between theories and their relationships to one another is surely an
important contribution to ongoing philosophical debate. In which sense are
dual theoretical descriptions equivalent? Just what kind of equivalence is at
stake here? Is the case of dualities different with respect to other more fa-
miliar forms of physical equivalences, first of all those related to symmetries
in general and gauge transformations in particular? And, finally, does dual
equivalence represent a case of underdetermination of theories by empirical
data, a traditional issue in the philosophy of science?
Starting from this last question Richard Dawid claims, in his contribution,
that a change of perspective on empirical equivalence takes place when it is
understood in terms of duality relations. His argument relies on comparing
the meaning of dual equivalence in string theory with the “traditional per-
spective on empirical equivalence” that he identifies as characteristic of 20th
century physics: i.e., the view relating the formulation of empirically equiv-
alent theories to “the high degree of flexibility of physical theory building
based on advanced mathematics”. In this case, the construction of empirically
equivalent theories followed, according to Dawid, from an excess of theoretical
freedom. In string theory on the contrary, he argues, empirical equivalence is
related to “the role of classical limits in a theory that has no free parame-
ters at a fundamental level”. As illustrated in Polchinski’s introduction to his
contribution to this special issue, the presence of dualities in quantum field
theories and string theories is related to the fact that a quantum theory may
have two or more classical limits: each dual description corresponds to the
theory quantized starting from one of these limits and all these descriptions
contribute to constructing the full quantum theory. Thus, instead of the re-
dundancy of physical descriptions in terms of which empirical equivalence is
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understood according to the traditional picture, Dawid concludes, duality re-
lations express on the contrary a “mutual inter-dependedness of perspectives,
which, on their own, only provide an incomplete understanding”.
While Dawid’s paper does not problematize the notion of equivalence between
scientific theories, a useful characterization of the varieties of equivalence re-
lations between quantum theories is provided by Doreen Fraser in her con-
tribution. In order to illuminate in which sense dual theories can be said to
be equivalent, she starts with distinguishing among: predictive equivalence,
a map between theories preserving the values of all expectation values and
the mass spectra; formal equivalence, a “translation manual” from one theory
to the other mapping all quantum states and quantum observables deemed
to have physical significance by one theory into quantities in the other theory
and respecting predictive equivalence; and physical equivalence, a map between
theories respecting both formal and predictive equivalence, and such that each
physically significant quantity in the one theory is mapped to a quantity in
the other theory with the same physical interpretation. In the light of such
distinctions, Fraser’s strategy is then to compare and contrast dualities (with
a focus on T-duality and mirror symmetry) with the technique of analytic con-
tinuation as used in quantum field theory and the status of descriptions of a
quantum field theory (relativistic versus Euclidean) related through this tech-
nique. This is a particularly useful exercise since, though sharing predictive and
formal equivalence, the two cases differ in terms of physical equivalence: while
the dual descriptions are judged to be physically equivalent, this is not the
case with the descriptions related through analytic continuation. Arguments
for the physical equivalence of dual theories must therefore be supported by
considerations beyond predictive and formal equivalence, Fraser concludes.
Pinpointing the differences with similar but not analogous cases surely helps
in clarifying the argument needed to support the claim that the dual theories
are physically equivalent. Fraser’s essay shows this very effectively.
Sharing the above strategy of investigating the sense in which dual theories
are equivalent by comparing with other instructive cases of equivalent theories,
Nicholas Teh and Dimitris Tsementzis devote their essay to investigating “the
intuitive equivalence” of (hyper-regular) Lagrangian and Hamiltonian classical
mechanics. Given the difficulty of finding a satisfactory answer to the ques-
tion of theoretical equivalence in general, their idea is to develop a fruitful and
appealing framework for conceptualizing the cases of theoretical equivalence
in physics by starting with analyzing a concrete framework for equivalence in
classical mechanics, namely the reformulation of classical mechanics developed
in the 1970s by W. M. Tulczyjew. Teh and Tsementzis show how this can be a
satisfactory framework for discussing theoretical equivalence, suggesting pos-
sible analogies with string dualities. In particular, on the basis of this example
they aim to show how concepts and analogies from logic and category theory
can be fruitfully employed in the endeavour to understand mathematically
5
sophisticated cases of theoretical equivalences.
A similar focus on the role of category theory, and in general meta-mathematical
tools, in investigating the nature of dualities can be found in the essay by
David Corfield. His paper is a contribution to the dialogue between philoso-
phers of mathematics and philosophers of physics in interpreting the dualities
and equivalences relevant to a highly mathematized research field such as cur-
rent fundamental physics. In particular, Corfield shows how much category
theory has to say on the subject (for example, in terms of “arrow reversal,
dualising objects and adjunctions”), and how the developments of this re-
search area have vindicated Nagel’s 1939 (p. 217) claim that “the concepts of
structure, isomorphism, and invariance, which have been fashioned out of the
materials to which the principle of duality is relevant, dominate research in
mathematics, logic, and the sciences of nature”.
Corfield’s analysis of the interrelations between the notions of invariance and
isomorphism of structure and the form of equivalence implied by dualities
in mathematics and physics is closely connected with the philosophical re-
flections on the relations between dualities and symmetries. Two essays are
specifically devoted to comparing dualities with gauge symmetries: De Haro,
Teh, & Butterfield, and Dean Rickles.
In his contribution, Dean Rickles gives some reasons for thinking them iden-
tical: all (exact) dualities are simply of the same species as gauge symmetries.
The aspects of the dual theories that map onto one another are part of the
unphysical, surplus structure only, in much the way that coordinates are un-
physical (gauge degrees of freedom) in general relativity, and one ‘chooses a
gauge’ for convenience safe in the knowledge that the (otherwise arbitrary)
choice will not affect physical results. This takes some of the mystery out of
dualities, and how it is that one can have such radically distinct world-pictures
as 10-dimensional and 4-dimensional universes mapping to one another. Un-
derneath this mapping there is preservation of invariant structure: the global
symmetries and physical quantities—indeed, one checks for the existence of a
duality by focusing on such matching of deep structure. Rickles argues that,
from this view it naturally emerges that there must be an invariant theory,
with these symmetry properties, that has the dual pictures as representations,
in much the way that one can eliminate the gauge freedom from a gauge theory
to get the intrinsic theory.
De Haro, Teh, & Butterfield likewise argue that certain aspects of theoretical
structure involved in dualities (such as the radius of a compactified dimension
in the context of T-duality) are to be viewed as gauge. However, they also
make more precise the nature of the duality relationship itself, highlighting the
specific conditions for such mappings (in particular, the mapping is viewed as
an isomorphism between theories, or, in more detail, as appropriate bijections
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between the two theories’ sets of states and sets of quantities). The important
related issue of what exactly is meant by ‘theory’ here is also carried out.
They also elucidate the sense (also mentioned by Polchinski and Rickles in
their essays) that some dualities (such as the gauge-gravity duality) are rather
curious in that they map gauge symmetries on one side of the duality to gauge
symmetries on the other side.
Building on a more general discussion of space in string theory (and the neces-
sity to tease apart distinct senses of ‘space’), Huggett puts T-duality to work
to argue for the claim that ‘phenomenal space’ (the broadly non-theoretical
space of observable physics) is not fundamental. Huggett focuses in on the
perplexing ontological issue of what exactly the physical situation is that un-
derlies a duality, such as a stringy world with one radius as compared to a
stringy world with the reciprocal of that radius. Merely saying that they ‘de-
scribe the same physics’ doesn’t settle what world-picture we are supposed to
form. Huggett argues that the radius is in fact indeterminate in such cases, and
draws a parallel with frames of reference in special relativity (and the issue of
which is at rest). Just as one can at least envisage using some ‘privileged’ phys-
ical frame (such as the fixed stars) to define preferred rest, so one can imagine
using the privileged phenomenal space we observe to ‘fix a radius’. Huggett
argues that both are equally unmotivated (and, indeed, “reactionary”). Given
that T-duals agree on observables (and so the phenomenal space) there must
be a mismatch between the string-based space (target space) and phenomenal
space, and so the latter cannot be part of the former framework but must
instead emerge at a less fundamental level.
As exemplified in Huggett’s contribution for the case of T-duality, an effec-
tive way to address the philosophical issues arising in relation to the dualities
of current fundamental physics is to focus on specific, concrete types of dual
equivalence between theories, trying to make the nature of such relationships
as precise as possible. Another particularly interesting case study for its ap-
parent ontological implications is weak/strong duality or S-duality (as is usual
to call it in the context of string theory). As illustrated in the contribution by
Polchinski, this duality type has become a basic ingredient in field and string
theories, in particular since the 1990s. In generic terms, it is described as an
equivalence map between two different theories ‘of the same physics,’ where the
weak coupling regime of one theory is mapped to the strong coupling regime
of the other theory and vice versa. Hence the special interest in this form of
duality, seen as a new tool for getting information on physical quantities in
the case of large values of the coupling constant, where the usual perturbative
methods fail, by exploiting the results obtained in the weak coupling regime
of the dual description.
The remarkable relevance of weak/strong duality to recent developments in
theoretical physics, as well as its deep connection with important mathemati-
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cal advances, 5 would be enough to raise the interest of philosophers, especially
in regard to such issues as the modalities of theory building and theory as-
sessment in highly mathematized physical research. The story of weak/strong
duality in the framework of fundamental physics – starting with the gener-
alization of Dirac’s electric/magnetic duality to quantum field theory in the
1970s, to arrive at its current role in string theory – undoubtedly offers rich
material for methodological and epistemological investigations. 6 Systematic
studies in such direction have yet to be undertaken, but it surely is only a
matter of time. Up to now, the attention of philosophers has focussed sub-
stantially on two points: the first one, regarding all physical dualities and thus
including weak/strong duality as a special case, is the general issue of theo-
retical equivalence mentioned above; the second, more specific point concerns
a well-known, though surprising feature of weak/strong duality: the fact that,
under this sort of duality, it often happens that what is viewed as ‘elemen-
tary’ in one description gets mapped to what is viewed as ‘composite’ in the
dual description and vice versa. At first sight, such interchanging role of ‘ele-
mentary’ and ‘composite’ seems to have strong implications for reductionism
and fundamentality issues. A common claim is that it naturally involves a
sort of ‘relativity of fundamentality’: what kinds of things are considered to
be fundamental depends on the dual description considered. The question is
whether it is legitimate to assume that there are implications of this sort, and,
in case, in what the impact of weak/strong duality on these and other related
philosophical issues really consists.
Kerry McKenzie, in her contribution, addresses the second side of this ques-
tion by carefully analyzing the implications of S-duality for the metaphysics
of fundamentality. She argues that the “relativity of fundamentality inherent
in S-duality represents something genuinely new” with respect to other famil-
iar cases of relative fundamentality, and shows how this relativity has both
realist and anti-realist implications. In particular, she critically discusses the
argument, defended in previous philosophical literature, 7 according to which
envisaging some form of ontological structural realism (in short, the thesis that
“all there is, is structure”) is the only option viable for escaping the antirealist
conclusions apparently implied by the elementary/composite ambiguity. She
shows that “there is no obvious route from S-duality to ontic structural real-
ism”, and discusses, more in general, what the significance of S-duality can be
for structuralist metaphysics.
The first side of the question is discussed in the essay by Elena Castellani.
Her contribution follows an ‘integrated’ approach, by analyzing the mean-
ing of the elementary/composite correspondence in the light of the history of
5 See, on these connections, Corfield’s contribution and references therein.
6 For a brief outline of this history, see Castellani’s essay in this volume, section 2.
7 See Dawid (2007), Rickles (2011), and Matsubara (2013).
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weak/strong duality. On this aim, a substantial part of her paper is devoted
to reconstruct the main developments of the idea of electric-magnetic dual-
ity from which the weak/strong duality type originates – from Dirac’s theory
of magnetic monopoles to the successive generalizations of electric-magnetic
duality in the context of (Abelian and non-Abelian) field theory and its first
extension to string theory. This historical analysis is then used as eviden-
tial basis for discussing the philosophical implications of weak/strong duality.
Castellani’s conclusion is that what this duality type specifically implies, in
the cases considered, regards not so much (or not always) mutual composition
of the particles of the theory (as the elementary/composite correspondence
can misleadingly suggest) as rather their different modes of appearance when
considering the different classical limits of the quantum theory, i.e. the dual
perspectives: the particles interchangeably play the role of Noether charges or
topological charges depending on the perspective under which the theory is
considered. The philosophical lesson to be drawn from this sort of ‘particle
democracy’, 8 she claims, is that the different characterizations of the parti-
cles of the theory – as elementary particles or as solitons, depending on the
particular formulations of the theory in certain regions of its parameter space
in the case of generalized electric-magnetic duality –, should not be taken too
literally.
To avoid a literal reading of the different characterizations of the dual coun-
terparts is a shared attitude, in this volume. It corresponds to the idea that
what the dual descriptions do not agree upon, should not be attributed a
real physical significance. 9 An already mentioned case is Huggett’s analysis
of how to understand the interchange of tiny and huge dimension connected
with T-duality in string theory. Another example is the interpretation of dual
correspondences in the case of gauge/gravity duality which is provided in the
contribution by Sebastian de Haro to this volume. His essay is devoted to
analyzing the viability of this type of duality – a duality between a theory of
gravity (defined in a ‘volume’ bounded inside a given surface) and a quantum
field theory (defined on that surface) – as a particular approach to quantum
gravity. On this aim, he considers the cases of AdS/CFT, black holes and Ver-
linde’s scheme, and discusses whether conditions for a theory of gravity such
as background independence are satisfied. In this discussion, the interpreta-
tion he argues for is what he calls an “internal interpretation” (following the
distinction between an external and an internal point of view introduced in
Dieks, van Dongen and de Haro, 2015). This is the interpretation according to
which there is no external context fixing the meaning of the physical quantities
8 This is the expression used by Ashoke Sen, one of the leading physicists working
in the field who has been particularly attentive to the possible implications of this
sort of dual correspondence.
9 In this sense some authors propose to view duality as a ‘gauge’. See Rickles’s
contribution, in particular.
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related through the duality: the two dual descriptions agree on everything that
is physically meaningful and the interpretation of the dual correspondents is
not fixed beforehand. For example, in the framework of AdS/CFT, 10 what
might be interpreted as a ‘length’ in the first description, can be reinterpreted
in terms of ‘renormalisation group scale’ in the dual description, as illustrated
by de Haro.
Given that, according to this interpretation, the two sides of the duality should
be taken as physically equivalent representations of the same theory, emer-
gence of one component (gravity) from the other (gauge theory) would seem
to be excluded. However, the issue of the relation between dualities and emer-
gence is a subtle one, and de Haro’s essay is a contribution to discussing it,
both in general and in the specific case of gauge/gravity duality. More pre-
cisely, by examining the conditions under which emergence of gravity can take
place, de Haro argues that emergence of gravity “can only relate to approxi-
mate dualities, the duality being modified by coarse graining”.
The essay by Tiziana Vistarini is a further contribution to the philosophical
reflection on the relation between dualities and emergence. Like Huggett, she
too attempts to say something about the deeper metaphysical claims (vis-a`-
vis spacetime ontology) underlying dualities. She carefully detaches emergent
spacetime claims from duality symmetries by focusing on standard philosoph-
ical conceptions of emergence, highlighting where crucial incompatibilities oc-
cur. Vistarini suggests that a ‘double-aspect monism’ (according to which
one and the same underlying structure presents in multiple distinct, though
nonetheless ‘real’ modes) offers the best prospect for a metaphysics of dualities.
This view respects the absence of a fundamental side of a duality while allow-
ing a thin notion of emergence (which she associates with spacetime structure
not being reducible to degrees of freedom internal to the dual theory to which
it belongs).
Closing this special issue, the contribution by Peter Bokulich goes full circle
back to the starting point by focusing on wave-particle duality (the first ex-
ample mentioned in the initial essay by Polchinski for illustrating the meaning
of a duality in quantum theories, i.e. the idea that the presence of a duality is
related to the fact that the quantum theory has two different classical limits).
Quoting from Polchinski’s introductory section: “given a quantum field theory,
one can take two different classical limits depending on what one holds fixed.
One limit gives classical fields, the other classical particles.” At this point, a
natural question is how much this kind of wave-particle duality can be related
to the original notion introduced in the context of non-relativistic quantum
10 Maldacena’s duality between a string theory (gravity theory) on an anti-de Sit-
ter spacetime (AdS) and a gauge theory (a conformal field theory, CFT) on its
boundary.
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mechanics. This is the question specifically addressed by Bokulich. His contri-
bution is in fact an attempt to clarify the different meanings of wave-particle
duality, starting with the notion of Bohr and its relation with complementar-
ity. Bokulich argues for a careful distinction among wave-particle duality and
what Bohr meant by complementarity. He also claims that there are some cru-
cial obstacles, having to do with the measurement problem, to linking Bohr’s
notion of wave-particle duality with the modern conception of duality, e.g.,
as outlined in Polchinski’s essay. Nonetheless, bringing wave-particle duality
under the rubric of dualities as intended in this issue has the potential to
impact upon the way wave-particle duality (or the related/conflated notion of
‘complementarity’) is conceptualised.
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